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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the trajectory of policy coherence for development (PCD) in the 
European Union (EU). In particular, it argues that the strong focus on institutional mechanisms, 
conceived as a way of overcoming different types of resistance, has had the effect that results achieved 
have by no means been commensurate with the expectations raised by the various reforms launched over 
the years. EU Member States have paid lip-service to the importance of PCD without translating 
commitments into more coherent (national and supranational) policies. Moroever, through an analysis of 
the Impact Assessment (IA) – the principal mechanism to promote PCD at EU level – prepared for the 
reform of the EU’s agricultural and fisheries policies in 2011-2013 it shows how bureaucratic 
arrangements have substantially failed to clarify the real impact of EU policies on (different types of) 
developing countries. The conclusion is that successful promotion of PCD is more than just having the 
right arguments and ensuring sufficient technical support, but is first and foremost a political undertaking. 
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Introduction 
The concept of policy coherence for development (PCD), which refers to the synergic 
interaction between foreign aid and all other development-related policy areas, has 
received significant attention at both academic and policy levels since the early 1990s. 
Much scholarly work has concentrated on the theoretical significance of PCD, the 
factors that enable or hinder its promotion, and the pernicious effects it has on 
developing countries (Forster and Stokke, 1999; Ashoff, 2005; Picciotto, 2005; 
Carbone, 2009; Sianes, 2013). Less attention has been attracted by the gradual evolution 
of PCD from being a donor responsibility, along a North-South division, into becoming 
a shared responsibility, with both emerging and developing countries playing a more 
assertive role in relation to actors in the North (Janus et al., 2015). At the policy level, 
efforts to improve PCD have not been framed as a political endeavour of managing 
trade-offs between policy interests but instead as a largely technical and managerial 
process (Adelle and Jordan, 2014; Prontera, 2014). The European Union (EU), 
recognised as one of the forerunners in PCD discourses (Hoebink, 2004; Carbone, 
2012), has also pursued this type of approach. True, PCD has been institutionalised 
since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, which provided a first legal basis eventually 
strengthened by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, and has taken a prominent place in the 2005 
European Consensus on Development and other politically relevant documents. 
However, the strong focus on institutional mechanisms, conceived as a way of 
overcoming different types of resistance, has had the effect that results achieved have by 
no means been commensurate with the expectations raised by the various reforms 
launched over the years. In fact, most EU Member States have paid lip-service to the 
importance of PCD without translating commitments into more coherent (national and 
supranational) policies.  
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To make this argument, this paper first revisits the trajectory of PCD in the EU, 
discussing the reforms proposed, the results achieved, and the resistance encountered. 
Then, it illustrates the clash of the technocratic approach with the political reality 
through an analysis of the Impact Assessment (IA) – the principal mechanism to 
promote PCD at EU level – prepared for the reform of the EU’s agricultural and 
fisheries policies in 2011-2013. The final section concludes, reiterating the fact that the 
successful promotion of PCD is more than just having the right arguments and ensuring 
sufficient technical support, but is first and foremost a political undertaking. 
 
Adopting reforms 
The origin of discussions on how public policies of advanced economies contribute or 
undermine development goes back to the creation of development cooperation itself. 
Initiatives between the 1950s and 1980s saw the application of re-adapted versions of 
technocratic approaches to development, generally imposed by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs), and with the burden placed mostly on developing countries (Forster 
and Stokke, 1999; Winters, 2004; Picciotto, 2005).1 It was only in the early 1990s that 
the concept of PCD took off in official policy discourses. The initial concern was that of 
increasing the returns of official development assistance (ODA) in the face of 
decreasing aid volumes – PCD was thus seen as complementing aid efforts – whilst 
reducing the negative impacts of ‘non-aid’ policies on broader development processes 
through ‘do-not-harm’ approaches. These views were crystallised in the Millennium 
Declaration and its associated Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Various donors 
used the MDGs, most specifically the first seven, as a framework for increased ODA 
spending. At the same time, through MDG-8, it was universally accepted that foreign 
aid would have to be supplemented with additional efforts in a number of development-
related policy areas, particularly trade, debt relief, and access to medicines and new 
technologies (Grieg-Gran, 2003; Ashoff, 2005; Picciotto, 2005). By the end of the 
2000s, PCD became one of the main components of the ‘beyond aid’ discourse, as 
evidenced by the 2011 Busan Global Partnership for Development Effectiveness and the 
negotiations of the post-2015 agenda: at least at the rhetorical level, there seemed to be 
a shift from ‘do-not-harm’ approaches towards more proactive, concerted approaches 
engaging actors beyond traditional donors and traditional development means (Carbone, 
2013; ERD, 2013; Janus et al., 2015). 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has certainly represented an 
important arena for various PCD discussions over the years. The DAC Secretariat, in 
particular, has sponsored the publication of policy studies and has attempted to elevate 
the political profile of PCD by supporting ministerial level meetings and declarations, 
though in vain (Picciotto, 2005; Carbone, 2012).2 But there is little doubt that the EU 
has been at the forefront of discussions, owing to inputs from the European Commission 
and some like-minded Member States (e.g. Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, and 
Sweden). The Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, innovatively, provided a legal basis for 
PCD (though it did not mention the term itself), requiring that the European 
Community, in its supranational policies, ‘take account of the objectives [of 
development cooperation] in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect 
developing countries’. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty extended this obligation to the whole of 
the EU, thus including also inter-governmental policies. Treaty provisions confirm the 
importance the EU attaches to PCD, but that alone has not been sufficient to guide 
further action and promote results.  
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It was then in the mid-2000s that the EU shifted gear, considering that between 
1993 and 2005 very little progress could be recorded, partly because of lack of interest 
of most Member States and partly because of clashes within the European Commission 
itself (Hoebink, 2004; Carbone, 2008). In the context of an ambitious project to federate 
the policies of the Member States, not only on ‘more and better aid’, the European 
Commission proposed ‘coherence for development commitments’ in 12 policy areas: 
trade; environment; climate change; security; agriculture; fisheries; social dimension of 
globalisation, employment and decent work; migration, research and innovation; 
information society; transport; energy (European Commission, 2005). These 
commitments were ardently endorsed by the (External Relations) Council in May 2005 
(Council, 2005) and were also incorporated in the European Consensus on Development 
in December 2005 (European Union, 2006). In that context, it was also decided to 
assign the monitoring process, centred on biennial reports, to the European Commission 
– though on the basis of information submitted directly by the Member States. The first 
two biennial reports highlighted significant variations between Member States in how 
they sought to promote PCD domestically and at the EU level (European Commission, 
2007, 2009c). These reports, which acted as a soft version of a ‘naming and shaming’ 
strategy highlighting failures and negative effects of non-aid policies, stimulated intense 
debates in the Council, but not much else. Interestingly, this strategy may have even 
been counterproductive for engaging policy communities and actors beyond those in 
development (Keijzer, 2010; OECD, 2014). Unsurprisingly, subsequent reports did not 
have the same level of ambition or prominence (European Commission, 2011d, 2013). 
Different types of resistance combined with lack of evident results (as we will see 
below) led the European Commission, and some willing Member States, to make some 
attempts to further specify the EU’s aspirations in this area. A first example is the 2009 
proposal to concentrate on five global challenges – intellectual property rights, food 
security, climate change, migration, and security – so that the EU could more 
proactively contribute to reaching the MDGs by the agreed deadline and could more 
easily pursue a ‘whole-of-the-Union’ approach (European Commission, 2009b). The 
reduction from 12 policy areas to five global challenges received mixed reactions. On 
the one hand, it was endorsed by the (External Relations) Council, which not only 
supported the allegedly more focused approach (it also expanded the first area to ‘trade 
and finance’), but also invited the European Commission to ‘establish a clear set of 
objectives, targets and gender-disaggregated indicators to measure progress in the 
selected priority areas’, whilst making better use of the IA procedure, for ‘a more 
focused, operational and results-oriented approach’ (Council, 2009, p. 2). On the other 
hand, it was criticised by the European Parliament’s Development Committee, which 
saw in it a sort of scale-down in ambition from the EU (European Parliament, 2010).3 A 
second example, which was affected by the commitment of different EU rotating 
presidencies, is the so-called ‘rolling work programme on PCD’, detailing concrete 
steps through which EU Member States and supranational institutions could deliver on 
the aspirations expressed in EU legal and political commitments. This initiative, which 
favoured processes over outcomes, did not have much effect besides promoting new, at 
times heated, debates in the Council (Keijzer, 2012). An ambiguous pattern thus 
emerged whereby the EU does not speak with one voice but seemingly reaffirms and 
undermines its own ambitions on PCD. 
The overall emphasis on bureaucratic arrangements reflected the popularity that 
new public management (NPM) and results-based management (RBM) concepts gained 
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in Europe in the 1990s and 2000s (Di Francesco, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; 
Peters, 2015). The promotion of PCD, in theory, benefited from the combined efforts to, 
on the one hand, improve accountability and transparency of EU policy processes, with 
the effect of representing policy processes as technocratic problem-solving exercises (in 
line with NPM thinking), and, on the other hand, draw on performance information to 
make informed choices, with the view to bringing management improvement and 
performance reporting (in line with RBM thinking). A key indication of this trend, and 
certainly one of the main innovations in EU governance over the past decade, is the 
introduction of the IA procedure in 2003 as part of the process of formulating new 
policies. The push for IAs was shaped both by the 2001 Sustainable Development 
Strategy and by the Commission’s ‘Better Regulation’ agenda, eventually replaced by 
the ‘Smart Regulation’ agenda (Rowe, 2006; Franz and Kirkpatrick, 2007). By outlining 
potential positive and negative effects of proposed policy actions, including synergies 
and trade-offs between competing objectives, IAs represent a tool for the exchange of 
technical information between interested parties (Bäcklund, 2009). At the same time, 
they may be used by consensus-seeking actors to de-politicise complex issues (Radaelli 
and Meuwese, 2010) or may represent the position of some stakeholders at the expense 
of others (Torriti, 2010). Despite comprising a highly fragmented setup, partly due to 
the expanding EU legislative competencies and partly as a result of the enlargement 
process, the European Commission argued that its ‘Smart Regulation’ agenda would be 
suitable for effectively promoting and pursuing all horizontal objectives that 
transcended particular sectors and areas, including PCD. But as we will see below, the 
pursuit of PCD through managerial means has turned out to be an elusive one.  
 
Achieving results 
One of the central challenges that advocates of the PCD agenda face is related to the 
difficulty to measure results, particularly because they are convinced that evidence-
based analyses could help generate significant political support (Carbone, 2012; Barder 
et al., 2013). The most practicable way to show progress – and the one that has 
prevailed in official discourses – is that of concentrating on processes (i.e., how things 
are done) rather than outcomes (i.e., what is achieved) (Di Francesco, 2001). The EU is 
no exception to this trend: much emphasis has been placed on efforts made by EU 
Member States and supranational institutions to set up bureaucratic arrangements, often 
implying a positive correlation between mechanisms and results. Interestingly, the 
European Commission (2007, 2009c) has noted that the use of various types of 
mechanisms has produced an increased awareness on PCD across Europe, but only 
modest results  – findings which have been corroborated by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) reports (Concord, 2011, 2013) and independent research 
(Egenhofer et al., 2006; Stroß, 2014). Mechanisms for promoting PCD comprise 
different features and vary from one country to another, depending on national political 
and administrative contexts. They range from ‘whole-of-government’ approaches, such 
as the one pursued by Sweden, requiring all policies to contribute to achieving the 
government’s development goals, to dedicated PCD units, such as the one operating 
within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2001 and 2012.4 In other cases 
more flexible forms of coordination are in place bringing together interested parties, 
such as inter-ministerial arrangements with PCD mandates, like those in Finland and 
Ireland (Galeazzi et al., 2013; van Seters et al., 2015).5 This emphasis on bureaucratic 
arrangements has also been at the heart of DAC discussions, where it was concluded 
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that the successful implementation of PCD depends on the willingness of countries to 
cater for three essential ‘building blocks’, which make up a ‘PCD cycle’: policy 
statements setting and prioritising objectives; coordination mechanisms; monitoring and 
reporting (Hudson and Johnson, 2008). An analysis of the peer reviews of all DAC 
members since 2000, however, reveals that the three building blocks have proven 
important to raising awareness across different government departments and ministries, 
but have not translated into greater PCD (OECD, 2014). 
Clearly, the role played by all types of mechanisms in facilitating results remains 
ambiguous at best, but one fact seems to be widely accepted: ‘their impact should not be 
overstated’ (Prontera, 2014, p. 17). In fact, an evaluation commissioned by a group of 
EU Member States has noted that there is not even a common understanding as to what 
impact is sought through these mechanisms (Mackie, 2007). Measuring results is 
complicated not only by a conceptual confusion on how to define development, but also 
by the absence of a significant body of empirical evidence that can more precisely map 
the extent to which EU policies affect developing countries. This is the result of a 
widespread underinvestment in the production of such evidence, and curiously the same 
countries that have expressed strong commitment to PCD have been reluctant to make 
available adequate research funding in this area (Hudson and Jonnson, 2008; Galeazzi et 
al., 2013).6 Moreover, the reports published by European NGOs, while playing an 
important role in public discourses, have mostly relied on anecdotal evidence or on 
suggestive case studies (Concord, 2011; 2013). The consequence of the dearth of 
evidence-based analysis is that of turning discussions about mechanisms into a largely 
symbolical exercise (Keijzer, 2012). 
Another obstacle to measuring progress in PCD is the absence of either a clear 
baseline that shows how coherent EU policies are at a given point in time, or any 
agreement on how coherent such policies should become by a given deadline. This 
means that assessing progress cannot even result in a debate about whether ‘the glass is 
half-full or half-empty’, and instead tends to produce disagreement both on the size of 
the glass and its contents. Thus, when some (for instance the European Commission) 
claim that the EU has made substantial progress and others (for instance European 
NGOs) describe progress as disappointing, both of them may be making valid points. 
This uncertainty has severely hampered the generation of a results-based approach in 
the promotion of PCD – in an era in which showing the actual impact of policies has 
become a matter of public accountability – and has allowed EU Member States and the 
European Commission to determine their own pace and move the goal-posts along the 
way (Keijzer, 2010). An attempt to introduce PCD indicators, within both the DAC (in 
2009) and the EU (in 2010) was resisted by various countries – including several EU 
Member States – highlighting the fact that there seemed to be a widespread preference 
among countries to stay at a general level, rather than being tied to anything that could 
constrain their freedom or being exposed to public shaming in case of poor performance 
(King et al., 2012; van Seters et al., 2015). Unsurprisingly, a recent study commissioned 
by a group of EU Member States has concluded that many countries appear to be, in 
principle, receptive of the idea of a ‘development friendliness index’, but at the same 
time there has been ‘insufficient political support for an internationally recognised and 
institutionalised approach’ (King et al., 2012, p. 49). 
Thus, the only proxy that could be used to measure outcomes remains the 
Commitment to Development Index (CDI), published every year since 2003 by an 
American think-tank, the Centre for Global Development, which compares countries 
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across a range of policies. Notwithstanding its various limitations (Picciotto, 2005), the 
CDI serves to highlight two points. Firstly, Europe’s collective commitment to 
development is average (i.e. better than Japan and the USA, but behind Canada and 
New Zealand) and does not improve as fast as in other parts of the world. More 
generally, Europe’s approach to development can be characterised as ‘energetically 
tackling the symptoms of limited economic opportunities for developing countries by 
providing substantial and effective aid but doing less to tackle the underlying structural 
causes of poverty’ (Barder et al., 2013, p. 848). Secondly, there is considerable variation 
between EU countries: the highest ranked nations are small, mainly Nordic countries 
(i.e. Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg), whereas some of the larger and richer countries 
(especially France, Germany, and Italy) perform relatively poorly overall. More 
importantly, ‘the results suggest that every country could improve its score considerably 
if it did no more than implement policies that have been proved to be politically feasible 
elsewhere … even without stretching the envelope of possibilities’ (Barder et al., 2013, 
pp. 837-8). 
 
Facing resistance 
Even the most reluctant actors acknowledge the importance of PCD, but problems exist 
in translating commitments into results. The overall meagre record by the EU, in spite 
of the various reforms proposed and adopted over the years, is due to three interlinked 
types of resistance; so much so that the pursuit of PCD has been portrayed as a ‘mission 
impossible’ for whoever attempts it (Carbone, 2008) – not to mention the fact that the 
number of PCD champions has decreased over the years. But before we examine each 
of them in turn, one general observation must be made: the EU is good at setting 
normative frameworks, but its compliance record generally does not match its 
ambitions. This rhetoric-reality gap does characterise other international actors, but 
‘they have not exposed themselves to it in quite the same way as the EU has due to its 
proclamations of its distinctiveness in this area and its commitment to a norms-based 
model of development’ (Smith, 2013, p. 526). 
The first type of resistance, which has attracted most attention in existing studies, 
is linked to the ‘compartmentalisation’ of public policy (Forster and Stokke, 1999; 
Ashoff, 2005; Adelle and Jordan, 2014; Prontera, 2014). Decisions affecting the 
developing world involve several policy fields – each characterised by a different set of 
interests, institutions, and ideas. In the past there was a clear division of labour between 
those who dealt with international development, and thus defended the interests of poor 
countries, and those who dealt with domestic development, and thus protected the 
interests of producers and consumers at home (Grieg-Gran, 2003). Clearly, this old 
dividing line has lost relevance, not least because the development agenda has 
substantially widened (Janus et al, 2015). The problem is that not only do different 
policy communities not necessarily share the same goals – and, of course, in a 
pluralistic system certain degrees of incoherence are unavoidable – but also that clashes 
occur with the development domain itself, most notably on the concept of development 
and its policy implications (Forster and Stokke, 1999; Ashoff, 2005; Carbone, 2008). 
Policy coherence resonates with the more established concept of coordination, but while 
coordination is necessary for tackling complex problems, coherence is not an automatic 
product of coordination (Di Francesco, 2001; May et al., 2005; Peters, 2015). Politicians 
and policy-makers face difficult choices. It is not surprising that, for instance, they are 
reluctant to consider the consequences of agriculture and trade protectionism for 
7 
 
developing countries. The argument that making public policies more development-
friendly serves the EU’s own interest in the long-term offers little consolation at times 
in which the EU’s socio-economic model is under considerable stress. The fact that the 
direct beneficiaries of PCD are located in foreign countries and that the development 
constituency – mainly consisting of committed politicians and bureaucrats and some 
NGOs – is far too weak in relation to other interest groups mean that the needs and 
interests of developing countries tend to succumb (Ashoff, 2005; Carbone, 2008).7  
The second type of resistance is linked to the EU architecture, most notably the 
co-existence of intergovernmental and supranational policies. Most studies on PCD tend 
mainly to highlight the opposition from Member States (Egenhofer et al., 2006; 
Hoebink, 2004; Carbone, 2008; Stroß, 2014). Their different views on what 
international development means and implies affects the way in which they deal with 
intergovernmental (e.g. security, migration) policies. Member States that joined the EU 
after 2004 are known not to be highly committed in this area (Horký, 2012; Lightfoot 
and Szent-Iványi, 2014), but neither are founding Member States such as Italy or France 
(Carbone and Quartapelle, 2015; Cumming, 2015). Thus, the PCD agenda at the EU 
level primarily moves forward through the involvement and commitment of a selected 
group of like-minded countries, most notably Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 
and partly the UK, who does not use the term PCD (van Seters et al., 2015). But not 
only do some EU Member States find it difficult to advance the PCD agenda at home, 
they also block progress on supranational policies (e.g. trade, agriculture, fisheries). By 
contrast, EU institutions show a more positive, or at least mixed, picture with an 
increasingly strong, but not always predictable, role played by the European Parliament 
(Egenhofer et al., 2006; Mackie, 2007; Stoß, 2014). While generally recognised as a key 
promoter of PCD within the EU, the European Commission is not a monolith, with 
different types of clashes occurring between its various Directorate Generals (DGs), 
some territorial and others of an ideological nature (Carbone, 2007). For instance, in the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) there were clear differences in approach 
between DG Trade and DG Devco (Young and Peterson, 2013). It is also interesting to 
note that (at least indirect) resistance to PCD comes from those who are eager to 
strengthen the impact of the EU globally: the argument following that a more coherent 
EU external action generally entails the subordination of development to foreign policy 
(Carbone, 2013). The Treaty of Lisbon was meant to bring different policy communities 
closer together, yet the promotion of different nexuses has resulted in retrenchment and 
reinforcement of traditional habits (Keukeleire and Raube, 2013).  
The third type of resistance comes from (parts of) the developing world, owing to 
the increased heterogeneity between and within countries (Barry et al., 2010). First, the 
tremendous growth recorded by some countries in the developing world means that, on 
the one hand, the separation between developed and developing countries has become 
blurred and therefore PCD has become a shared responsibility (Janus et al., 2015). On 
the other hand, it entails that the EU can no longer take for granted that developing 
countries simply accept what is on offer (Smith, 2013). For instance, the reform of the 
EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) would benefit middle-income countries who 
could compete with the EU in global markets, but would lead to preference erosion for 
low-income countries; it would hurt net food exporters, but would have a more 
ambiguous effect on net food importers. It is along these lines that there has been 
opposition by some countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group to 
reforms of the sugar and bananas protocols, which had brought them significant benefits 
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for many years (Matthews, 2008). Secondly, inequality and uneven access to power and 
resources within developing countries has increasingly become a reality. Elite interest 
groups, as it happens in developed countries, seek to preserve their influence over 
specific policy areas to the detriment of the rest of society (Barry et al., 2010). An 
important example comes from the common fisheries policy (CFP): fees paid by the EU 
to access waters in developing countries constitute an important source of revenue for 
central governments, but would not necessarily be welcomed by coastal communities 
who would feel penalised in terms of both economic development and food security 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2008). Interestingly, developing countries have rarely been 
involved in policy discussions on PCD. For instance, the Cotonou Agreement, 
governing the relations between the EU and the ACP group, includes an article allowing 
ACP countries to question any EU policy which could likely have an impact on their 
development. They have seldom invoked such provision, and when they did it they 
seemed happy with a simple reassurance by the European Commission that their 
concerns would be taken into account in the preparation and implementation of future 
policy measures (European Commission, 2009c; Keijzer, 2010). Of course ACP 
countries may not receive adequate information or may not have the necessary expertise 
to engage with the EU. A more plausible explanation, however, is that they do not 
manage to act as a cohesive group and, therefore, their ability to shape EU policies is 
necessarily lowered.  
 
PCD in practise: reforming agricultural and fisheries policies 
Although the EU has for a long time acknowledged the importance of avoiding 
incoherence between policies, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the use of 
the term ‘PCD’ owes much to the CAP. Using the analogy of ‘giving with one hand and 
taking away with the other’, NGOs have been pursuing and exposing cases of 
incoherent policy-making for more than 20 years. Many of these cases demonstrated 
that countries receiving EU aid for agricultural development were at the same time 
flooded with heavily subsidised agricultural produce from Europe. The other area that 
historically has received significant attention from development practitioners is the 
CFP, which already in the 1980s was seen as constituting a major threat not only to the 
marine environment but also to the life of coastal communities in developing countries. 
Both CAP and CFP have over the years gone through a number of reforms which have 
brought tangible benefits to developing countries, particularly to African farmers in 
terms of market access and to coastal communities with the adoption of the Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements (FPAs) (Matthews, 2013). At the same time, a number of 
incoherencies have survived, such as the EU’s resort to export subsidies, the increased 
number of non-tariff barriers, the strict rules of origin, the disappearance of the 
commodity protocols and the potential negative impact that preference erosion in both 
agricultural and fisheries policies may have on food security (Matthews, 2013). In line 
with the purpose of this paper, to illustrate the natural limits of the EU’s technocratic 
and process-oriented approach to promoting PCD, this section limits its scope to one 
aspect of the recent reforms of the CAP and the CFP, most specifically their effects on 
developing countries as seen through the two IAs launched in 2011. 
The IA procedure was set up by the European Commission (2002) to improve 
policy-making and advance quality in regulation. Replacing the previous single-sector 
type assessments, the new system was created to perform an ex-ante integrated 
assessment of the most important initiatives and those with the most far-reaching 
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impacts across a range of economic, environmental and social criteria. In terms of the 
actual procedure, it was established that the lead DG would be in charge of preparing 
and submitting a ‘preliminary’ IA to the College of Commissioners, which could ask for 
an ‘extended’ IA. It was also stated that Commission DGs would be guided by a series 
of guidelines, published in 2003 and revised in 2005 and 2009. To improve the quality 
of IAs, a five-member Impact Assessment Board was created in 2006: its main 
functions are that of examining the quality of all draft assessments and recommending 
potential improvements (Bäcklund, 2009). Thus, the primary attraction of IAs, which 
obviously have a strong rationalistic appeal, would be that of making governments and 
regulatory agencies rely more on evidence-based analysis and of making them more 
accountable (Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010). However, the execution of IAs has not met 
initial expectations: numerous concerns have been raised on their overall quality, 
particularly the quantification of costs and benefits of alternative proposals and the 
effective involvement of stakeholders (Kirkpatrick and Franz, 2007; Pollack and 
Hafner-Burton, 2010; Torriti, 2010). The IA procedure was originally seen by the 
European Commission as a ‘a powerful mechanism’ to further advance the promotion 
of PCD – and was further stressed by the 2009 revised guidelines, stating explicitly that 
more attention would have to be paid to assessing the impact of all EU policies on 
developing countries (European Commission, 2009a) – and corresponds to the political 
commitment expressed by the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, which called for an 
‘evidence-based and result-oriented approach to promoting PCD’ (Council, 2012). 
The CAP takes up more than a third of the EU’s budget and is frequently cited for 
its negative consequences for developing countries (Klavert et al., 2011). Despite 
formally complying with World Trade Organisation requirements, EU-subsidised 
agricultural products compete unfairly with developing country exports; moreover the 
presence of high tariffs prevents developing countries from exporting their products to 
the EU (Te Velde et al., 2013). The CAP has been subject to a series of reforms since its 
inception which have substantially reduced some of the distortions that it has been 
generating on world markets as well as its role in the EU budget. Nevertheless, it 
remains a central component of the EU’s internal social and development policy, and its 
primary stakeholders (farmers and the agri-industry) have exercised strong pressure on 
EU decision makers to preserve its role as a redistributive, albeit mostly inefficient, 
instrument (Klavert and Keijzer, 2012). The latest reform of the CAP, started in 2011, 
was informed by an IA, with DG Agriculture in the lead. The main IA report failed to 
spell out the effects of the CAP on third countries and instead stated that the effects on 
developing world markets would be limited under all scenarios considered under the 
proposed change (European Commission, 2011b, p. 77). Only one of the 12 annexes, 
which was drafted by DG Devco, contained some references to developing countries. In 
particular, this annex simply stated that ‘impacts [of the CAP] would differ according to 
the trade profile of the country, i.e. the country’s trade balance, whether it is a net 
exporter or importer of the product in question, relative trade with the EU, the country’s 
level of development and trade regime, or the country’s possible preferential status’ 
(European Commission, 2011c, p. 4). Moreover, whilst highlighting the lack of relevant 
data, it curiously concluded that the CAP has gradually become more coherent with 
development objectives and that all negative effects on agriculture in developing 
countries would be further reduced – though the absence of a clear baseline and/or 
targets in relation to how coherent EU agricultural policy should be made the final 
recommendations rather vague (European Commission, 2011c). 
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The CFP constitutes a rather marginal component of the EU budget, yet it is 
strongly criticised, mainly because it subsidises activities to an extent that in several 
Member States the estimated costs of fishing exceeds the total value of catches (Engel et 
al., 2013). The EU is the world’s largest importer of fish and fisheries products, of 
which a substantial part is caught in the territorial waters of developing countries 
(Keijzer, 2011). The adoption of FPAs in the early 2000s, meant to demonstrate the 
EU’s commitment to both the environment and development, has resulted in a gap 
between intentions and reality. Structural problems in the fishing sector of developing 
countries, combined with a number of restrictions limiting access to the EU market, 
have exposed a number of unresolved contradictions between fisheries and development 
policies (Bretherton and Vogler, 2008). Also in this case, the proposed reform was 
preceded by an IA (European Commission, 2011a). Contrary to the CAP, an important 
PCD-relevant role was played by the IA Board, which explicitly required the main 
report to address the likely effects of all policy scenarios on third countries. The final IA 
report, however, largely restricted the analysis to FPAs and Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs), and excluded the majority of EU vessels that fish 
outside EU waters under private agreements or joint ventures, making it difficult to 
judge the full impact of the changes on developing countries. This was especially 
problematic for FPAs, given that their nature and operation were analysed without 
looking at the implications that any changes in FPAs could have for third countries and 
the ability of EU fishermen to make use of them. Making FPAs stricter could lead to 
more fishermen no longer fishing under FPAs, and instead using private agreements and 
joint ventures. By failing to explore how the EU could ensure that its fishing vessels 
operating in developing countries’ national waters outside FPAs act in keeping with the 
CFP, the IA failed to make an adequate assessment of the likely effects of the CFP 
reform on development (Keijzer, 2011).  
Both the CAP and CFP reform processes indicate that IAs are inherently political 
processes and that the promotion of PCD is not a matter of solving problems but more 
one of managing different interest groups, with the more powerful ones generally 
prevailing. The two IAs did not function as neutral technocratic tools but instead largely 
served to support the reforms proposed by the European Commission in view of its 
primary objectives and preferred stakeholder groups. The preparation process of both 
IAs also shows that there was a low level of demand articulation from developing 
countries – and European NGOs did not manage to effectively represent their voice 
either.8 Moreover, the two reports reveal a serious lack of data on the effect of current 
and possible future policy reforms on developing countries, resulting from low 
investments in research related to PCD. More generally, independent analyses (Adelle 
and Jordan, 2014) and the European Commission (2011d) in one of its biennial reports 
have noted that IAs have failed to clearly determine the impact of EU policies on 
developing countries. In 2011, an NGO (Concord Denmark) conducted a screening of 
IAs from 2009 to mid-2011 and showed that only seven of the 77 relevant IAs actually 
devoted some attention to developing countries. In 2013, it repeated the same exercise 
and of the 177 relevant IAs only 33 assessed or mentioned the potential impact for 
developing countries (Concord, 2011, 2013). There is another point to underline: IAs do 
not generally distinguish developing countries, thus under-estimating the fact that these 
are not a homogenous group, and that the same initiative may affect different countries 
in different ways. 
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Conclusions 
Few examples capture the EU’s reputation and credibility in the international arena as 
well as the concept of policy coherence for development. By providing over half of the 
global aid, the EU is praised for its high level of ambition in international development, 
but at the same time is sanctioned for the contradictions of its policies and for its 
relatively unsuccessful efforts in fundamentally reforming some of its more obviously 
incoherent policies. This article has shown how discussions on promoting PCD in the 
EU have evolved from a political and issue-driven agenda to a discussion that promotes 
a more generalist and horizontal treatment with a major emphasis on institutional 
arrangements for policy making. This attention should be seen not only as indicative of 
an evolving understanding of the concept, but more importantly as a compromise that 
presents a common ground between leading and resistant Member States. Many efforts 
made in past and present decades have concentrated on efforts to put in place adequate 
institutional arrangements and mechanisms that are assumed to help improve 
performance in promoting PCD – in line with the popularity of NPM and RBM 
concepts that have strongly influenced EU governance since the early 2000s. While 
providing some hints and guides as far as the EU’s ambition and priorities are 
concerned, they do not adequately address wider conceptual and political challenges 
associated with the concept, thus hampering further discussion and progress. As 
illustrated by the recent reforms of the EU’s agricultural and fisheries policies, little to 
no relevant analysis is produced through such processes and the effects in terms of 
promoting PCD are negligible.   
Despite likely being the only way of keeping PCD on the EU’s agenda in light of 
significant Member State resistance, the technocratic focus chosen has prevented a clear 
management of expectations. Whereas the EU has over the years invested considerable 
political capital in reporting processes and carefully formulated Council Conclusions, it 
recently recognised that much work remains to be done and that ‘PCD is essential for 
the credibility of the EU as a global actor’ (Council, 2012, p. 1). The EU has under-
invested in evaluating the effects of its policies in developing countries, and has not 
acted on the demand, albeit timid, for more PCD that has been expressed by developing 
countries. The negotiations towards a post-2015 framework on global development has 
provided such opportunity, but once again this has resulted in the use of general 
language arguing for closer collaboration in areas including technology transfer, 
migration, raw materials and transparent business practices (ERD, 2013; OECD, 2014). 
Tasking the EU’s diplomatic corps with entering into dialogue with developing 
countries on such contentious issues cannot be adequate. The EU has managed to fill 
many technical and institutional gaps since enshrining its PCD ambition in EU treaties 
and in political documents, yet its legitimacy hinges on its ability and willingness to 
breathe political life into these structures.    
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1 PCD was in disguise in the concepts of ‘comprehensive planning’ in the 1960s; ‘integrated 
development’ in the 1970s; ‘structural adjustment’ programmes in the 1980s; and ‘poverty reduction 
strategy papers’ in the 1990s. The domination of the BWIs in setting the international agenda on 
development was only partially questioned by the creation of UNCTAD and the demands of the Global 
South on economically advanced states to avoid undoing the gains of development assistance through 
adverse public policy measures. These discussions led to the commitment by developed countries in a 
historical UN General Assembly resolution not only to provide 0.7% of their Gross National Income as 
Official Development Assistance but also to refrain from increasing or creating (non-)tariff trade barriers 
to developing countries (Forster and Stokke, 1999; Winters, 2004; Picciotto, 2005). 
2 The discussion in the DAC involves different levels: (1) important strategic documents, from the 
1996 strategy document Shaping the 21st Century: The Contributions of Development Co-operation to 
the 2012 OECD Strategy on Development; (2) numerous research publications highlighting the 
‘development dimension’ across a number of different policy areas; (3) various compendiums identifying 
tools and mechanisms for the successful promotion of PCD (Carbone, 2012). Nevertheless, a recent 
review, based on expert interviews, has concluded that PCD has gradually become more important at the 
OECD level, yet it has never been a central priority (King et al., 2012).  
3 One key result of this report was the call for a standing rapporteur on PCD, a position that since 
rotates between the different political groups represented in the Committee (European Parliament, 2010). 
4 The unit was discontinued in December 2012 following a reorganisation of the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The consequence is that the capacity of the ministry in this area has greatly diminished 
(Galeazzi et al., 2013). 
5 An important point is that EU Member States make reference towards achieving more coherence 
at EU level and, generally, have a specific department or unit dealing with EU development cooperation. 
Yet, awareness of commitments made in the EU context has remained low in ministries beyond those 
dealing directly with international development (Galeazzi et al., 2013).  
6 Examples of important exceptions to this pattern are recent pilot studies commissioned by the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Operations and Evaluation Department (IOB, 2014), as well as 
the inclusion of a specific research call on PCD in the EU’s Horizon 2020 research work programme. 
7 NGOs have been particularly active in the promotion of PCD in numerous countries, for instance 
in Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden.  
8 It should be noted that the ACP group did choose to submit a contribution to the public 
consultation organised in preparation of the CFP impact assessment (Keijzer, 2011), while no developing 
country contribution was received in the case of the CAP (Keijzer and King, 2012). 
